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Abstract 
In this paper I discuss Donnellan’s 
claim of the pragmatic ambiguity of the 
distinction between referential and 
attributive uses of definite des-
criptions. The literature on the topic is 
huge and full of alternative analysis. I 
will restrict myself to a very classical 
topos: the challenge posed by Kripke 
to Donnellan’s distinction with the case 
of a dialogue on an attempt to update 
a misdescription. I claim that to treat 
the problem of the referential use of 
definite descriptions we need not only 
to take into account the context of 
utterance, but also the cognitive 
context with its epistemic restrictions 
and the possible different contexts of 
reception of the same utterance. I try 
to show different aspects of what can 
be called “pragmatic ambiguity”, which 
seem not correctly considered by 
Kripke, and connect them to the basic 
tenets of Grice Cooperative principle. 
Keywords: Assertion. Charity Principle. 
Definite Descriptions. Reference. 
Speech Acts. 
 
Resumo 
Neste artigo, discutimos a alegação de 
Donnellan da ambiguidade pragmática 
da distinção entre usos referenciais e 
atributivos de descrições definidas. A 
literatura sobre o tema é enorme e 
cheia de análises alternativas. 
Restringir-nos-emos a um topos muito 
clássico: o desafio proposto por Kripke 
à distinção de Donnellan com o caso 
de um diálogo sobre uma tentativa de 
atualizar uma descrição errada. Afir-
mamos que, para tratar o pro-blema 
do uso referencial das descrições 
definidas, precisamos não apenas 
levar em conta o contexto do 
enunciado, mas também o contexto 
cognitivo com suas restrições epistê-
micas e os possíveis diferentes 
contextos de recepção do mesmo 
enunciado. Tentaremos mostrar dife-
rentes aspectos do que pode ser cha-
mado de “ambiguidade prag-mática”, 
que parecem não ser corre-tamente 
considerados por Kripke, e conectá-los 
aos princípios básicos do princípio 
Cooperativo de Grice. 
Palavras-chave: Asserção. Princípio da 
Caridade. Descrições Definidas. Refe-
rência. Atos de Fala. 
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1 Pragmatic ambiguity 
 
We often find in pragmatics many tools and topics 
used in the field of rhetorics in new way. Ambiguity is a 
typical case. In this paper I will refer to a problem deeply 
entrenched in the debate on pragmatics: the idea of 
pragmatic ambiguity. On this idea there is a sharp contrast 
between different trends of thought. Donnellan (1968) 
wrote about a pragmatic ambiguity between the 
attributive and referential uses of descriptions, and 
Stalnaker (1970), commenting on Donnellan’s paper, 
explains what is means “pragmatic ambiguity”. The case 
proposed by Donnellan concerns two possible uses of a 
sentence with a definite description like: 
 
(1) Smith’s murderer was insane. 
 
Depending on the situation I may us the description 
“Smith’s murderer” in two radically diffeerent ways: 
 
(2) Smith’s murderer [whoever he is] is insane 
 
The sentence (1) may mean (2) if uttered in a scene 
presenting a vision of the brutal manner in which Smith, a 
very kind person, was killed. In another situation, looking 
at the person charged with Smith’s murder and behaving 
very strangely at the trial sentence (1) may mean 
 
(3) Smith’s murderer [that person in front of us] 
is insane.  
 
The attributive use would be exemplified by (2), 
tipically treated à la Russell (there is a unique x who is a 
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Smith’s murder and he is insane), while the referential use 
would be exemplified by (3), where there is no Russellian 
analysis, but some kind of direct reference to the intended 
individual. The two intended interpretations are not 
explicit in the utterance, and Donnellan claims that there 
is some kind of ambiguity that is neither syntactic nor 
semantic, but pragmatic. Stalnaker agrees and poses a 
further possibility about the idea of pragmatic ambiguity, 
concerning the problems posed by presuppositions (a 
typical case discussed in pragmatic analysis). The failure of 
the presupposition of existence creates problems for (2), 
but not for (3):  if there is no murder, but Smith committed 
suicide or was killed by more than one person, then there 
is no unique individual that murdered Smith and 
therefore, with (2), we fail to refer; instead, with (3), we 
refer to the person accused of murder even if he is 
innocent, and even if Smith committed suicide, because 
we intend to refer to him, to that person in front of us. 
Therefore, Stalnaker (1970) concludes (with another 
example) that, given that the same sentence may have 
different truth values depending of a missing 
presupposition, this seems to be a case of pragmatic 
ambiguity. From the example it follows that a pragmatic 
ambiguity may have semantic consequences. 
Contra Donnellan’s analysis, Kripke (1975) claims 
that pragamtic ambiguity does not exist unless inside 
Speech Act theory, and the phenomenon of ambiguity is 
either syntactic or semantics. Furthermore, Kripke claims 
also that there is no syntactic or semantic ambiguity of the 
article “the”, and a distinction between speaker’s reference 
and semantic reference would give a better account to the 
problems posed by Donnellan’s distinction. The debate on 
the contrast between Donnellan and Kripke went on for a 
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while, until a new wave of interest in definite descriptions 
was prompted by the hundredth anniversary of Russell’s 
“On Denoting” (e.g. Bezuidenhout and Reimer (2004), 
Neale (2005), Liston (2007)). From then onwards, the 
discussion has produced many deep analysis, and it is 
almost impossible to take care of all different 
interpretations. I will therefore keep the scope of my 
paper on the topic of Kripke’s challenge and on his 
example of two dialogues one of which he claims 
Donnellan’s distinction cannot explain. 
Before discussing Kripke’s claims, a warning about 
an ambiguity in the debate itself may be useful. We have 
basically two kinds of interpretation of the phenomenon, a 
pragmatic and a semantic one1. The so-called Kripke’s 
“pragmatic solution” to the problems posed by Donnellan 
does not mean accepting the idea that Donnellan’s 
distinction is a pragmatic, on the contrary. Speaking of 
“pragmatic solution” we normally refer to the idea that 
denies any ambiguity (either pragmatic or semantic) to 
                                                          
1 Presenting the two kinds of solutions,  Neale (2004) remarks that on one 
side, the “unificationist” Russellian analysis is supported, in different ways, by 
Simon Blackburn, William Blackburn, Hector-Neri Castañeda, Donald 
Davidson, Martin Davies, Gareth Evans, Peter Geach, Paul Grice, Stuart 
Hampshire, Saul Kripke, Stephen Neale, Mark Sainsbury, Nathan Salmon, John 
Searle, Scott Soames, David Wiggins, while other scholars opt for a 
semantically distinct referential reading (Joseph Almog, Jon Barwise, Anne 
Bezuidenhout, Robyn Carston, Michael Devitt, Keith Donnellan, Jennifer 
Hornsby, David Kaplan, David Lewis, Chris Peacocke, John Perry, François 
Récanati, Marga Reimer, Bede Rundle, Stephen Schiffer, Robert Stalnaker, 
Howard Wettstein). I follow a unificationst view, but moderated by the claim 
that we can render Donnellan’s idea of pragmatic ambiguity inside this view. 
From the above list there is a name missing: Kent Bach (2007) claims that 
there are other pragmatic inferences beyond Gricean implicature and the 
referential/attributive distinction might avoid to be treated neither as a 
semantic ambiguity nor as syntactic ambiguity, but expressing a new kind of 
pragmatic phenomenon.  
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uses of definite article. A pragmatic solution tyically 
accepts a Russellian analysis for all the cases presented by 
Donnellan: a speaker may even use a false definite 
description, interpreted in the standard Russellian way, 
and by some kind of Gricean implicature, the hearer gets 
the right content, maybe just realizing that the description 
is false. The alternative “semantic solution” (e.g. Devitt, 
2004) claims, against Kripke, that there is a semantic 
ambiguity, contra what Donnella’s claims about his 
distinction as representing not a semantic, but a 
pragmatic ambiguity. Therefore neither the first nor the 
second interpretation seem interested to Donnellan’s idea 
of pragmatic ambiguity. The topic of pragmatic ambiguity 
of Donnellan’s distinction instead is the topic of the 
present paper. 
 
2 Belief Reports: Making viewpoints explicit  
 
In a final remark of his (1979) paper, “A puzzle about 
belief”, Saul Kripke says that, when considering situations 
which lead to contradictory reports of belief, “we enter 
into an area where our normal practices of interpretation 
and attribution of belief are subjected to the greatest 
possible strain, perhaps to the point of breakdown. So is 
the notion of the content of someone’s assertion, the 
proposition it expresses.” (p. 423) The present paper is 
intended to be a contribution to the concept of “content of 
an assertion”, but also to the problem of understanding, 
following Kaplan (2005), who claims that to properly treat 
the problem of definite descriptions we need to 
distinguish carefully the semantic aspect and the 
epistemic aspect, the first concerning truth conditions of 
sentences containing definite descriptions, the second 
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concerning our capacity to understand definite 
descriptions, even without cognitive access to what is the 
described object. Following the ideas of Donnellan, Kaplan 
(2012) seems more disposed to let cognitive aspects enter 
semantics as “ways of having in mind”. In both cases the 
topic of understanding becomes a relevant topic that 
touches upon the intentions behind the uses of definite 
descriptions. 
In the present paper I will use different versions of 
the classical example proposed by Leonard Linsky (1963): 
looking at a man who treats kindly a nearby woman, Jones 
sincerely asserts:  
 
(4) “Her husband is kind to her” (short for “The husband 
of the lady is kind to her”)2 
 
Assuming, as Linsky does, that the lady has no 
husband, and the man was the lover of the woman, what 
should we say of the assertion itself? 
We may assume that the speaker is sincere, and the 
assertion is not an abuse; we may further assume that the 
speaker has at least some justification for his belief in 
asserting (4), for instance the confidence with wich the 
man treated the woman might have been an evidence that 
he might have been her husband. Although it is not a 
conclusive justification, we might think that the convention 
behind the act of asserting are realized and we may claim 
                                                          
2 For the sake of simplicity I will not consider the further difficulties of the use 
of pronouns, that – for the present discussion – would be assimilated to a 
standard definite description as the (syntactically incorrect) “the husband of 
her”, or, as Kripke sometimes uses “the man who marrried her”. (We might 
use other classical examples, but I prefer to keep the specific esample 
discussed by Kripke, 1977).   
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that the assertion is not a misfire3. Now, there remains a 
last question: What is the content of the assertion? And Is 
it true or false? 
Linsky claims that the assertion should be neither 
true nor false, following a Frege-Strawson attitude. Keith 
Donnellan claims that Linsky's answer may work for the 
attributive use of the definite description, when the 
description is applied to whoever fits the description. 
However, if the expression “her husband” has a referential 
use, we cannot simply say that the assertion is false. 
Actually Donnellan (1966, p. 26) claims:  
 
(5) “when a speaker uses a definite description 
referentially he may have stated something true”.  
 
Assuming that the lady is a spinster, this claim 
sounds strange and in need of a justification. But the main 
aspect that makes us uneasy to say that Jones said 
something true is that we would not and could not report 
                                                          
3 We may assume that an assertion, to be a “well formed” speech act, needs to 
be true, justified and sincere; we need all these three conditions to be fulfilled; 
if some of them is missing, we have three different kinds of failures: 
 (i) abuse: to assert something believing it to be false is an abuse of the 
convention of asserting or, as Austin would say, an abuse of the 
presupposition of what is an assertion (that’s the classical point of denying the 
possibility to say “p and I don’t believe that p”) 
 (i) misfire: to assert something without any ground is more than a simple 
abuse of the act of asserting; to assert something you need to be in a position 
to do that. For Brandom (1994) you need to be “entitled” and have the 
capacity to answer “why did you said that?” Shortly: we assert only what we 
can justify, if not we do not have the right to make a proper assertion. 
(iii) falsity: assertion is intended to say something true. However sincerely 
saying something false, with some non-conclusive evidence, is not a standard 
case of “misfire”. We reject the content because false, but we accept that the 
speaker has uttered a false assertion, or – more modestly – an assertion we 
judge false. 
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his assertion with his words, if we we knew that the lover 
was not the husband. Assuming the information that the 
lady is a spinster, we should not report Jones’ belief as 
 
(6) “Jones believes that her husband is kind to her” 
 
Belief reports should make it explicit the interplay of 
the points of view of speaker and reporter. Perry (2013) 
has given an excellent rendering of this problem in his 
taking of Kripke’s puzzle about belief. I will use some 
simplifications here, in order to give the most basic 
alternative way of giving a report of (4). We may use a de 
re report of the following kind:  
 
(7) “of the person he though was her husband, Jones 
said he was kind to her”.4 
 
In saying (7) we make explicit that: (i) even if the 
intention of the speaker was to tell the truth, we explicitly 
refuse to endorse his description (ii) Jones said of the 
person he is referring to, that he is kind. Therefore, our 
report is both on John’s point of view and on our own5. 
                                                          
4 Actually we do not necessarily need to use a de re rendenring as: “John says 
of the person he believes to be her husband, that he is kind to her” but also: 
“John says that the person, he believes to be her husband, is kind to her”. The 
fact that we may use both de re and de dicto rendering of the report is 
coherent with Donnellan's claim that that attributive/referential use has 
nothing to do with de dicto/de re distinctions, which is recognized by  Kripke 
(1997 and 2005), who shows the importance of scope in treating different 
aspects of the interplay of definite descriptions and modalities. 
5 The wording we use in reports (both de dicto and de re) seems to have an 
intuitive impact on different degrees of commitments, as Brandom 1994 
would say. Here I suggest to distinguish (i) committed-report: “John says that 
her husband is kind to her”; (ii) uncommitted-report: “John says that the 
person he believes to be her husband is kind to her” (iii) anti-committed 
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However, we have not yet a clear idea of which is the 
content of Jones’ assertion, or the reason for which 
Donnellan claims (5).  
Given the scene setting, the normal assessment of 
Jones’ assertion is that Jones says at the same time 
something true (that person is kind) and something false 
(that person is a husband). This is one of the most 
widespread solutions of Donnellan’s puzzle (Neale (2004), 
Devitt (2004), Soames (2005)). But Donnellan claims, with 
(5), that in a referential use a speaker may say something 
true, notwithstanding the attributive use would define the 
sentence as false. Does the idea of pragmatic ambiguity 
have some interesting theoretical consequences on the 
definition of the content of an assertion? I will offer 
different arguments whose main point will be the defence 
of the idea that an assertion may have at the same time 
different contents depending on different uses, 
presuppositions and cognitive contexts.  
 
3 Belief update: a test for semantic or pragmatic 
interpretations  
 
The ambiguity of referential/attributive uses hints at 
two possible intentions of the speaker, without any 
previous assumption on the actual marital status of the 
lady. As Donnellan (1966, p. 20): “In general, whether or 
not a definite description is used referentially or 
attributively is a function of the speaker’s intentions in a 
particular case.”  In the particular case in which the 
speaker is influenced by the evidence of some intimacy 
                                                                                                                                   
report: “John says that the person he erroneously believes to be her husband 
is kind to her”. In (i) I don't take distance from John's belief, while in (ii) I don't 
reject it, but I don't undertake it either; I reject it explicitly only in (iii). 
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between the two, he may be brought to intend “her 
husband” referentially; if the speaker is just remarking the 
general happiness of the lady, he may easily intend the 
same expression attributively because the evidence points 
to a possible husband, whoever he is, which is so kind to 
let the woman happy. Is this a real pragmatic ambiguity?  
Kripke challenges Donnellan’s distinction, to be 
contrasted with his solution of the difference between 
speaker’s reference and semantic reference. Kripke (1977, 
p. 256) changes the stage setting as follows: the lady has a 
husband who is in general not kind to her (with the 
supposition that the man in the scene is the lover “to 
whom she has been driven by her husband cruelty”). 
Kripke then proposes two possible dialogues in which an 
interlocutor B tries to make the speaker aware of his 
mistake. In this example we have a shift from belief 
reports to belief update: how can we make a speaker 
change his mind in front of new information? 
In what follows “A” stands for “Jones” and “B” stands 
for an interlocutor, who, by assumption, knows the actual 
marital status of the lady: 
 
Dialogue (I)  
A: “Her husband is kind to her” 
B: “No, he isn’t. The man you’re referring isn’t her 
husband”. 
 
Dialogue (II)  
A: “Her husband is kind to her” 
B: “He is kind to her, but he isn't her husband” 
 
Kripke presents at least four different claims against 
Donnellan. I will check each of those claims and try to hint 
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at some possible alternatives. 
 
 3.1 Donnellan claims that his distinction is neither 
syntactic nor semantic, but it is a pragmatic ambiguity. 
Kripke (1977, p. 262) claims that “if the sentence is not 
(syntactically or) semantically ambiguous, it has only one 
analysis; to say that it has two distinct analyses is to 
attribute a syntactic or semantic ambiguity to it.” Besides, 
although Donnellan claims that his distinction implies a 
pragmatic ambiguity, his paper seems to be compatible 
with a semantic ambiguity. But his distinction – Kripke 
argues – does not amount to a semantic ambiguity that 
falsifies Russell’s analysis.   
 
The claim that there is no pragmatic ambiguity 
seems an exaggeration. We can speak of pragmatic 
ambiguity: why not? It does not only concern speech acts 
(but on this see section 4.1 later), and it may concern 
misunderstanding intentions in context and or having 
different presuppositions. As we have seen, with 
Stalnaker, a difference in presuppositions may be 
considered a pragmatic ambiguity and may have a 
semantic import, bringing about the possibility of a 
sentence having different truth conditions depending on 
different intentions held by the speaker and depending on 
the context of utterance. I will claim that a speaker may 
also have two different intentions at the same time, 
depending on different targets of his utterance (see 4.1).  
A first step for clarifying the matter may be a 
“translation” of the two interpretations with an explicit 
rendering of the different intentions of the speaker:  
 
(8) “the person A has in mind is kind to her”  
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(9) “the person that has the property of being her 
husband, whoever he is, is kind” 
 
It is apparent that (8) and (9) may have different 
truth conditions. We might also say that the first sentence 
concerns reference and the second denotation (e.g. 
Capuano, 2016), and this solution seems a variant of the 
solution grounded on the difference between speaker’s 
reference and semantic (denotational) reference. The 
point however is that the ambiguity of (4) does not 
concern lexicon nor the syntactic structure, but the 
intention of the speaker. If we accept Kripke’s point that 
there is no semantic ambiguity in the meaning of “the”, the 
idea that there is a pragmatic ambiguity, depending on the 
context and the intention of the speaker, it is still available. 
The fact that the analysis of this particular example may 
be treated also with the support of the distinction 
between speaker’s reference and semantic reference does 
not exclude per se Donnellan’s solution, which purports to 
make the assertion of (4) a true statement and not a false 
statement triggering an implicature by its falsity. Contra 
Kripke’s pragmatic solution, we may notice that, according 
to Grice, an implicature is connected to the speaker’s 
intention that a hearer understands the falsity of what is 
said and derives by this recognition the implicated 
content. However, this does not seem the point of Jones’ 
utterance, that seems to be produced according to a 
sincere belief that the man in the scene is the husband, 
and therefore his intention is to make this person 
recognised as such. As Donnellan (1966, p. 14) claims, 
“There is a presumption that a person who uses a definite 
description referentially believes that what he wishes to 
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refer to fits the description.” Therefore there is no 
implicature in the Gricean sense from the point of view of 
the speaker. Also for this reason, some authors like 
Ludlow and Neale (2007) claim that the pragmatic solution 
à la Kripke gives “an ex post facto justification” and does 
not provide an explanation of how or why a hearer infers 
what the speaker intends to communicate. 
 
3.2 The best treatment of the phenomenon of definite 
descriptions is the unificationist view, that is the treatment 
of all cases under some kind of Russellian formulation and 
Donnellan’s referential uses are not “inexplicable” on 
Russell’s theory (Kripke, 1977, p. 257). 
 
Accepting the idea that we have a pragmatic 
ambiguity seems to have as consequence that the two 
interpretations (8) and (9) have different logical forms: the 
referential reading would give a singular proposition or an 
ordered pair with the individual in the scene and the 
property of being kind, while the attributive reading would 
have the standard quantificational Russellian form. The 
referential use would be similar to the use of a proper 
name, which directly refers to an individual. Contra this 
possibility, Kripke’s answer is that both readings have the 
form “ ( x (x))” or “the x Fx) Gx”6. Therefore “her 
husband” means something like  
 
(10) “the unique person that has the property of being 
her husband” 
 
                                                          
6 We might also see in Russell some second thoughts about reconsidering 
something like a presuppositional analysis (as Frege had already suggested). 
On this see Kaplan (2005). 
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What Donnellan tries to explain with the “referential 
use” amounts to the speaker’s reference, that is the is just 
“the object to which the speaker wishes to refer, and 
which he believes fulfills the Russellian conditions for 
being the semantic referent.” (Kripke, 1977, p. 266). Given 
that the lover is not the husband, Kripke’s pragmatic 
solution of a conversational implicature seemed the 
simplest solution: realising the falsity of the description, 
we understand the speaker’s reference by implicature.  
But we have other possibilities to keep a 
quantificational reading and yet keeping a difference 
between referential and attributive uses. Neale (2004), 
Soames (2005) and Ludlow-Neale (2007) propose for the 
referential uses a formula like 
 
(11) “[The x Fx] & x = that”  
 
We would have two different quantificational 
readings, one for the attributive and one for the 
referential use. However, this solution has two 
disadvantages. On the one hand it would make the two 
interpretations relying on different hidden syntactic 
differences, imposing a syntactic ambiguity that would 
require a deep revision of our syntax. On the other hand it 
runs the risk to become an example of the semantic 
ambiguity proposed by Devitt 2004 as an alternative to 
Kripke’s view. In fact, Devitt (2007, p. 28-31) claims that the 
solution given in (11) is only pseudo-Russellian.  The 
insertion of a demonstrative like “that” makes the 
quantified formula almost useless and the descriptive 
component semantically inert, making the definite 
description analogous to a complex demonstrative.  
Are there alternatives? My suggestion is to insert in 
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the quantificational form a function of the speaker’s 
intention, that would be activated in context and would 
become idle when not activated. The basic structure of a 
definite description would give priority to referential uses, 
as giving a restriction on the general form “the x Fx” as  
 
(12) “The unique x Fx the speaker has in mind”  
 
What the speaker has in mind may depend, at first 
choice, on the particular (wide) context of utterance, or the 
situation in which the sentence is uttered. This solution 
might be presented as a unitary account which would 
work both for referential and attributive uses of definite 
descriptions: 
 
(13) “The x  Fx”  
 
First of all, this would vindicate Donnellan’s claim (5) 
according to which the content of the assertion with a 
misdescritpion may be true. Certainly, “her husband is 
kind” is literally wrong if the man is not her husband. It 
might be a “reference fixing description”. But what are 
reference fixing descriptions, given that they fix the 
reference even if they are wrong? On what ground can we 
use a reference fixing description in this case?  
Usually most of our definite descriptions, in 
everyday conversation, have two main features: (i) they 
start from the context of utterance (ii) they use an 
approximate description. This has a consequence also in 
the possibility of understanding a description: in front of a 
definite description, the first step of the hearer is to check 
the possible individual, which is present in the scene and 
appears to fit the description. “What the speaker has in 
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mind” therefore means: “what appears to have the 
property given by the descriptive content used by the 
speaker”. If nothing is found in the scene to which we can 
apply the description, then we skip to the attributive use. 
This means that the speaker has in mind whoever fits the 
description, even if not present in the scene. Therefore the 
logical structure of a referential description is the same at 
the syntactic level to the one of an attributive use of a 
description; the availability of an individual (apparently) 
fitting the predicate in the context disambiguates the 
utterance of a definite description, making it a case of 
referential use.  
Referential uses of definite descriptions are 
probably the first way children learn to use definite 
descriptions. If there is an x in the context that has the 
property F or for which there is some evidence in the 
context that has the property F, then we have a referential 
description. If there is nobody in the context at least 
slightly fit for the description, we shift to the attributive 
use. This is an empirical hypothesis of the evolution of 
language understanding in children, but it may also be 
considered a theoretical possibility to think the use of 
definite description depending on the context of utterance 
and the intention of the speaker.  
In our proposal,  may be considered a function of 
the speaker’s default justificatory attitude, or contextual 
evidence. What we say is said with the assumption that we 
are not perfect knowers: a definite description has the aim 
to pick an individual, not to give the most perfect scientific 
definition of an individual. Approximate, vague, even 
mistaken definitions are the most standard uses of 
definite descriptions (for a variety see Korta Perry, 2011, 
chapter 8). Our habit to use loose talk would give “her 
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husband” a reading that, following (12), would be 
something like  
 
(14) “What the speaker is justified by momentary 
evidence to be her husband” 
 
If this proposal can be conceived as a way to keep 
the Russellian quantificational structure then this proposal 
is in agreement with Kripke’s idea that Donnellan’s 
distinction does not undermine a Russellian analysis. 
However it requires a deep change in the view held by 
Russell, inserting an epistemological aspect in semantics (a 
justified “way of having in mind”). 
 
3.3   the distinction between speaker’s reference and 
semantic reference, in analogy with the Gricean distinction 
between speaker's meaning and semantic meaning, 
(Kripke, 1977, p. 262-264) is a better solution to the 
problems posed by Donnellan that the distinction 
between referential and attributive uses. 
 
According to Kripke (1977, p. 270), on the ground 
that “pronominalization can pick up either a previous 
semantic reference or a previous speaker’s reference”, we 
may say that (see p. 112) 
 
in dialogue (I) B uses “he” to refer to the semantic 
referent of “her husband”,  
in dialogue (II) B uses “he” to refer to the speaker's 
referent.  
 
In respect of (II) also Donnellan may easily explain 
the dialogue. While B uses speaker’s reference (from 
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Kripke’s perspective) he may also makes a referential use 
of the description, that co-refer with the use made by A 
(from Donnellan’s perspective). However, Kripke argues 
that the first dialogue would be impossible to explain with 
the conceptual tools given by Donnellan. 
In the fist dialogue, saying “he isn’t” (“he is not kind”) 
B simply refers to the semantic referent of”her husband” 
while Donnellan’s distinction would permit B’s assertion 
only in the case B misunderstood the speaker’s use of “her 
husband” as attributive; but, at the same time, it is clear 
that B has understood to whom A was referring. This 
difficulty to explain the first dialogue with Donnellan’s 
distinction is considered by Kripke as evidence against the 
idea that we have a semantic distinction between 
referential and attributive uses. 
However, also Kripke’s solution is not so clear: in 
dialogue (I) it is apparent that A refers to the lover and not 
to the husband, and yet B uses “he” as semantic reference 
and not as speaker’s referent. Although the basic idea is 
that pronominalization can refer to a previous semantic 
reference, the question is where the previous semantic 
reference comes from. Where does the semantic 
reference come from? From the information given by God 
to B? From the assumption on the theoretician’s 
assumption? Why couldn’t Donnellan make a similar 
move? B might use attributively “he” in answering, 
although acknowledging that A used “he” referentially. Just 
like the “he” of semantic reference does not corefer with 
the “her husband” of the speaker, in the same way the 
attributive use of “he” does not corefer with the 
“referential use” of A. In this case the speaker proposes ex 
abrupto to change the game and use the description 
attributively. Using “he” attributively, B rejects the use 
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done by A, just like using “he” as semantic reference 
rejects the speaker’s reference proposed by A.  
Besides, if we used a quantificational reading with 
the insertion of a function connected with speaker’s 
viewpoint, we might explain the dialogue as follows: 
 
(15) A: the x  Husband x is kind to her 
B: the x  Husband x is not kind to her.  
The x  Husband x ≠ the x  Husband x 
 
In prose A means: “the person I am justified to 
believe is her husband is kind to her”; while B means: “the 
person I am justified to believe is her husband is nor kind 
to her. What I believe to be her husband is different by 
what you believe to be her husband”. Making the different 
presuppositions explicit permits the dialogue to be 
performed with better capacity of persuasion and with the 
honest recognition that both speakers may be wrong (on 
this last point see the last section of the present paper). 
 
3.4 On the two dialogues presented as test to check 
Donnellan’s intuition Kripke says that his tendendy is “to 
think that both dialogues are proper” (Kripke, 1977, p. 270) 
that is they are acceptable dialogues that show two similar 
attempts to correct the mistake of the speaker, who 
erroneously believes that the man near the woman is her 
husband. 
 
From the previous discussion, another point follows, 
concerning the dissimilarity between the two dialogues. 
Kripke himself seems uncertain whether both dialogues 
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are proper, but has the “tendency” to think so. From a 
pragmatic viewpoint they are not, granted that the 
question under discussion (QuD) is the kindness of the 
person in the scene. We are looking at a scene and we are 
giving our judgment on it. Dialogue (II) keeps the question 
under discussion, and proceeds, showing a mistake in the 
definition. In Dialogue (I) B abandons the question under 
discussion and changes topic, missing the point of A’s 
assertion, which concerns the present scene and not the 
marital status. A seems not interest at all of the marital 
status of the lady, but only of the kind attitude of the man 
towards the woman. In dialogue (I) B changes the QuD 
and put as the main problem the marital status of the 
lady. This is unfair to a normal conversation: the main core 
of Grice Cooperative principle is to make your contribution 
following “the accepted purpose or direction of the talk 
exchange”. Therefore, from the viepoint of conversation, 
Dialogue (II) is more correct that dialogue (I), contra the 
claim that “both dialogs are proper” (Kripke, 1977, p. 270). 
  In a setting where the question under discussion 
were the marital status (for instance in a trial for divorce), 
then the attention would shift from the topic of kindness 
to the topic of “who is the husband”. But, given the 
premises of the dialogue, this is not the main interest of 
the speaker.  
My conclusion is that the two dialogues are not on 
the same level and dialogue (I) is not proper from a 
pragmatic viewpoint, given that it violates the Cooperation 
principle, abruptly changing the direction of the talk 
exchange. It is not only a question of fairness or 
politeness, but a question of understandability of the 
conversation. This problem is related more to a theory of 
dialogue and communication than to semantics. And we 
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end these remarks on the consequences of the pragmatic 
ambiguity of Donnellan’s distinction in understanding 
communication strategies 
 
4 Communication strategies: shifting contexts and 
uncertain reasoning 
 
Descriptions (even "wrong" descriptions) do not 
come alone; they come with implicit justifications. 
Therefore, assertions can be interpreted according to their 
possible and most plausible justifications. This is linked to 
a justification requirement for any assertion: we may 
always ask which justification can be given for an 
assertion. In the case discussed here it is easy to 
understand Jones – unless he had been intentionally said a 
falsity – as a speaker who justifies his belief with a default 
rule of the kind: “if x is a man and he is openly intimate 
with a woman, then typically x is her husband”. It is 
reasonable to think that most of our thoughts have some 
default built in, which makes us think in an approximate 
and quick way (see Bach (1985), but also Benzi-Penco 
(2018)). We may use this default rule for referring to an 
individual, while keeping into account the information we 
have at hand. This connection between the content of an 
assertion and the information we have gives rise to two 
problems. What happens when the speaker has a lot of 
information on the different participants to the 
conversation and their beliefs or assumptions? Which role 
has our limited capacity of information, an aspect we give 
for granted in everyday conversation? The last two 
sections try to answer these two points. 
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4.1 Shifting contexts of reception 
 
The role of the awareness of the speaker about the 
beliefs of the audience is often passed by very quickly, or 
just given as a restriction on which kinds of lexical tools 
the speaker can reasonably use to be understood. 
Speakers do not speak in the void, but always in a context 
of utterance that normally coincide with the context of 
reception (or the context of production is often the same 
of the context of audition). Sometimes the “context of 
reception” can be different from the context of utterance, 
for instance with a message left somewhere for people to 
read or hear later (Predelli). However, we may use the idea 
of context of reception to define different sets of hearer in 
the same conversation. In fact, participants to a 
conversation often have different assumptions and 
presuppositions. It is one of the typical communicative 
capacities of politicians to use a sentence, and, at the 
same time, mean different contents for different people. 
Not only politicians, but also normal speakers may 
develop the ability of saying different things, expressing 
different propositions, with one utterance. If a speaker is 
aware of the different assumptions of different hearers he 
may utter a sentence with different intended 
interpretations, related to the different presupposions and 
assumptions of the hearers.  
Let us go back to the situation in which the lady has 
a husband who is not kind and Jones says “Her husband is 
kind to her”. What does Jones mean if he is aware of 
different presuppositions of different groups of hearers? 
Let us assume that Jones comes to know that the lady has 
a terrible cruel husband, but he also knows that (i) most 
people in the audience have no idea of that (ii) few people 
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know that the lady is married and (iii) a restricted group of 
people know that the real husband is cruel and therefore 
unkind. We have here a case where the same sentence 
may expresse different contents, different propositions, 
depending on the beliefs entertained by the audience and 
their accessibility to right information. We have here a new 
case of “pragmatic ambiguity”:  the same utterance can be 
interpreted as different speech acts, with different 
propositional contents. These different speech acts and 
different contents depend on the intention of the speaker 
to address different hearers at the same time, 
aknowledging that the utterance would be interpreted in 
different ways by different hearers, with their different 
presuppositions. As Neale (2004, p. 77) says, “What A 
meant by uttering X on a particular occasion is determined 
by, and only by, certain very specific interpreter-directed 
intentions A had in uttering X.” In our case the speaker 
may have different specific interpreter-directed intentions 
given that the awareness of different kinds of 
presuppositions or assumptioms the speaker knows the 
hearers (or interpreters) have. In the three cases given 
above, with the utterance of “her husband is kind to her”, 
Jones will contemporarily express, besides a possible 
attributive use, three different speech acts: 
 
(i) An assertion with a referential 
description saying something true of the 
intended referent, as understood by most people 
within the audience. In fact this sentence may be 
the best way to convey the right information to 
hearers, ignorant of the marital status of the lady, 
that the relevant man in the scene is actually kind 
to her. 
ÁGORA FILOSÓFICA 
126 • Ágora Filosófica, Recife, v. 19, n. 1, p. 103-134, jan./abr., 2019 
 
 
(ii) An assertion with the intention to refer 
to the real husband (and this is a referential use 
in absentia), with the awareness of saying 
something that triggers a problematic 
interpretation for the hearers who know that the 
lady is married and may wonder why Jones is 
saying that in that context. 
(iii) An assertion with the intention to refer 
to the real husband (as above), meaning – for the 
few that know that the real husband is really 
unkind – something that would implicate, from 
the apparent falsity, a form of irony of mokery 
(e.g.  that the husband is so kind to let her staying 
with a lover, or what you like). 
 
Here the contents of the assertion express different 
truth conditions because they pick different individuals, 
and at the same time express different speech acts not 
only with different locutionaly meaning, but also 
perlocutionaly meaning (if you give me the availability of 
this possible interpretation of perlocutionaly meaming, 
but we may use the idea of implicature instead). This is a 
very apparent case of ambiguity in conversation 
depending on the complex intentions of the speaker, a 
topic for every theory of communication This possibilty 
would vindicate an aspect of what Kripke (1977, p. 271) 
claims: the problems raised by Donnellan would be well 
treated by a general theory of speech acts. 
But there is a deeper problem dealing with 
referential and attributive uses of descriptions, which is 
brought to us by our condition of uncertainty given our 
limited means of obtaining information from the context. 
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4.2 Bounded rationality and default charity principle 
 
The debate on Donnellan’s example has always 
been made from the point of view of metaphysics, 
assuming some given state of affair (either there is no 
husband, or there is an husband who is kind or unkind to 
her and is not identical with the person in the scene). 
A hearer ignorant of the facts can easily accept the 
assertion as something true of the person Jones is 
referring to. If other relevant information enter the 
common ground, for instance the hearer comes to know 
that the woman have an unkind husband who is not 
identical with the person referred to by Jones, the 
sentence can be interpreted as expressing a different 
content. But if we want to describe the working of our 
everyday conversations, we have to take care of limited 
information we are bound (just think of Herbert Saimon’s 
bounded rationality), a condition that obliges us to always 
reason under some form of uncertainty. In this 
perspective our rendering of dialogue (I) in (15) seems the 
best way to treat limited information. If we don’t use a 
hypothetical metaphysical viewpoint (what is the truth of 
the matter), we are left with different justifications. Maybe 
speaker B believes that the lady has an husband, but he 
may not know that they divorced recently, and what he 
think is a lover is just the new husband. Therefore B is 
wrong in criticising A, who speaks correctly. But, who 
knows? Maybe the new husband just divorced and he is 
kind because they both agree about their separation and 
she is happy of the money coming from the divorce. And 
so on. Every dialogue in normal conversation is full of 
possible new information challenging the assumptions 
given for granted. While conversating we are not obliged 
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to check what we are saying as in a courtroom. Therefore 
definite descriptions can always be considered as 
provisional determinations that can be used for referring, 
with the clause that we may always change our mind, if 
necessary. 
We may conceive every assertion as linked to 
different “reasonable” assumptions of the participants in a 
dialogue. This default version of Quine’s charity principle 
would help us to make speakers more rational than they 
appear when they are interpreted with too stubborn 
logical rules. Default assumptions are something we use 
for the sake of simplicity with the idea that they may be 
easily discharged or “restricted”, like in the following 
imaginary justification of John's assertion: 
 
a) Given that a person and a lady are together in front 
of me; 
b) assuming from the behaviour that the person near 
the lady is the husband; 
c) the person behaves with kind gestures and words; 
therefore 
d) her husband is kind to her. 
 
Here step b) contains a false assumption; but the 
assumption works just in order to find an expression to 
refer to the person introduced in a). Therefore the 
particular assumption b) can be discharged later, if 
needed, in front of new information; however the 
conclusion can be kept. We need only to update the 
descriptive means, abandoning the “wrong” definite 
description, and keeping the relevant content, saying 
something like: 
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16) The man who appeared to be her husband is kind to 
her. 
 
To interpret with charity the approximate assertions 
of our intelocutors implies to treat their descriptions as 
incomplete and provisional. This amounts to claim that a 
definite description, intended as a short way to refer to 
some individual, is essentially incomplete.7 I refer here to 
the abundant literature on “incomplete” definite 
descriptions, like “the book”, where there is more than one 
book and you need the context to fill some gaps of the 
description in order to have a defined content and 
therefore a complete proposition (see for instance Neale, 
2004, p. 93 ff).  Why don't we assume that this kind of 
incompletness can be generalized to most, if not all, 
definite descriptions?  Natural languages have too many 
possible contexts that it is almost impossible to consider a 
definite description “complete” without any reference to 
the context of utterance and the cognitive contexts of the 
participants to the conversation (see Penco, 2010). 
Therefore we may take any definite description as if it 
were a linguistic expression which is only a first 
approximation to a proper description; with some 
ingenuity we may find a context in which it does not work 
unless with some specifications and new formulations; in 
our case an instance of reformulation of "her husband", 
coherent with the intentions of the speaker, might be, in 
analogy of (15) above: 
                                                          
7 We have more precise definite desctiptions in scientific settings and in legal 
settings, where the epistemic requirement is stronger than in everyday 
language. The problem of incomplete description has been abundantly 
treated with an “implicit” or “explicit” strategies, according to whom we rely on 
context or we may enrich the set of properties. See Neale 2004. 
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(17) “the person in front of me whose behaviour makes 
me think he is the husband of the relevant lady in the 
scene”.  
This is different from the normal set of “completing” 
properties, as it is usually assumed in standard treatments 
of incomplete descriptions (as hinted above). Here the 
completion concerns the explicit expression of our 
epistemic condition: the limited epitemic access to the 
relevant information available to the speaker. Normally, in 
everyday conversation, we do not make our limited 
epistemic access explicit, but we know it and we normally 
take it for granted when entertaining a normal 
conversation. Therefore we may consider it a standard or 
a convention we normaly tacitly take into account8. 
A possible conclusion might be that any referential 
description should be accepted by default, as if it were by 
default correct, with the implicit acknowledgment that we 
may always find some possible situation in which the 
description fails to be correct, and needs reformulation. 
But this should also be the case of the interlocutor who 
believes to know the truth. Also the interlocutor may fail 
to know the truth of the matter, given that everyday 
conversation is linked to time and with time states of 
affairs change and what we knew as true may become 
false (a husband may divorce, a lover may become a 
husband, and so on). We need therefore to use a 
                                                          
8 Apparently this phenomenon does not seem to belong to the general 
problem of aphonic elements in linguistic exchange (on which see Neale 
2016). However it is something we whould represent as general background 
assumption that triggers the possibility of loose talk, grounded on a trade off 
between reliability and efficiency or between precision of desciptions and 
getting to the point (see Bach, 1984, p. 45 and Neale, 2004, p. 103). 
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generalized default principle of charity which assumes 
that definite descriptions are always a first approximation 
to better descriptions, and are to be taken in contexts as a 
short way to refer to somebody with the best possible 
mean at hand for the purpose of referring.  
The context of utterance shows whether the use of 
the description is referential or attributive, that is whether 
we use descriptions (i) to refer to somebody when we 
don't want to use other directly referential means 
(indexicals or gestures), or (ii) to look for somebody we 
have not yet individuated in the present scene. 
Truth is fixed only in context; everything we say is a 
mixture of different features that need effort to be 
extracted and to be judged as true or false. But we have 
the default principle of charity that suggest us to take for 
true the most relevant aspects of the conversation, and 
suggest to remark the aspects of falsity, also when they 
are not actually relevant for the goals of the conversation, 
with great care. In this case Dialogue (II) should be the 
standard, not dialogue (I). Why this charitable attitude? 
Well, because of our epistemic uncertainty; granting 
sincerity condition for an assertion, we cannot give it for 
granted the truth of our viewpoint in a conversation; 
things could always be different (the man in the scene 
might have been the husband in disguise). 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
After giving a short justification of the idea of 
pragmatic ambiguity, connected with the arguments once 
used by Stalnaker to justify Donnellan’s suggestion, I have 
distinguished two aspects in the debate on referential and 
attributive uses of descriptions: the problem of belief 
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report and of belied updare using an example discussed 
by Kripe (1977). In the first case we need to find a way to 
make explicit the different viewpoints of the speaker and 
the reporter. In the second we need to find the best way 
to help the speaker to update his beliefs.  
I have shown that we may have a way to translate 
Kripke’s first dialogue in a way that  
(i) renders the different viewpoints clear, inside a 
unificationist view (a repair of Russell’s analyisis) and this 
vindicates Kripke, for whom we may use a quantificational 
reading for both referential and attributive uses. But we 
accept this solution at the cost of making the 
quantificational reading more complex, with the insertion 
of an epistemological restriction in the logical form.  
 (ii) permits to justify the referential-attributive uses, 
showing that the two dialogue are not of the same level, 
and while Dialogue (II) is “proper”, Dialogue (I) is not, 
because it does not follow Grice’s cooperation principle 
given that it changes the aim of the conversation and 
changes the question under discussion.  
This analysis brought me to face two further aspects 
of the ambiguity of Donnellan’s distinction. I have shown 
the possibility to use a sentence as expressing at the same 
time different propositions depending on the awareness 
of the speaker of different beliefs or presuppositions 
entertained by different hearers, showing a new kind of 
ambiguity. Eventually I have claimed that we need to 
represent the fundamental and intrinsic limitation of our 
epistemic access we take for granted in everyday 
converstation. We may therefore explain our unders-
tanding of referential uses of DD, considering it inside the 
exercise of bouned rationality.   
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